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How	  do	  micro	  cases	  lead	  us	  to	  surprising	  macro	  claims?	  Historians	  often	  say	  that	  
the	  micro	  level	  casts	  light	  on	  the	  macro	  level.	  This	  metaphor	  of	  ‘casting	  light’	  
suggests	  that	  the	  micro	  does	  not	  illuminate	  the	  macro	  straightforwardly;	  such	  
light	  needs	  to	  be	  interpreted.	  In	  this	  essay,	  I	  propose	  and	  clarify	  six	  interpretive	  
norms	  to	  guide	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences.	  	  
I	  focus	  on	  marginal	  groups	  and	  monsters.	  These	  are	  popular	  cases	  in	  social	  and	  
cultural	  histories,	  and	  yet	  seem	  to	  be	  unpromising	  candidates	  for	  generalization.	  
Marginal	  groups	  are	  dismissed	  by	  the	  majority	  as	  inferior	  or	  ill-­‐fitting;	  their	  lives	  
seem	  intelligible	  but	  negligible.	  Monsters,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  somehow	  
incomprehensible	  to	  society	  and	  treated	  as	  such.	  First,	  I	  show	  that,	  by	  looking	  at	  
how	  a	  society	  identifies	  a	  marginal	  group	  and	  interacts	  with	  it,	  we	  can	  draw	  
surprising	  inferences	  about	  that	  society’s	  self-­‐image	  and	  situation.	  By	  making	  
sense	  of	  a	  monster’s	  life,	  we	  can	  draw	  inferences	  about	  its	  society’s	  mentality	  
and	  intelligibility.	  These	  will	  contest	  our	  conception	  of	  a	  macro	  claim.	  Second,	  I	  
identify	  four	  risks	  in	  making	  such	  inferences—and	  clarify	  how	  norms	  of	  
coherence,	  challenge,	  restraint,	  connection,	  provocation,	  and	  contextualization	  
can	  manage	  those	  risks.	  My	  strategy	  is	  to	  analyze	  two	  case	  studies,	  by	  Richard	  
Cobb,	  about	  a	  band	  of	  violent	  bandits	  and	  a	  semi-­‐literate	  provincial	  terrorist	  in	  
revolutionary	  France.	  Published	  in	  1972,	  these	  neglected	  studies	  show	  Cobb	  to	  
be	  an	  inventive	  and	  idiosyncratic	  historian,	  who	  created	  new	  angles	  for	  studying	  
the	  micro	  level	  and	  complicated	  them	  with	  his	  autobiography.	  They	  illustrate	  
how	  a	  historian’s	  autobiographical,	  literary	  and	  historiographical	  interests	  can	  
mix	  into	  a	  risky,	  and	  often	  rewarding,	  style.	  
	  
marginal;	  monster;	  microhistory;	  norms	  of	  interpretation;	  context;	  
autobiography;	  historiography	  
PREPRINT	  ONLY	  (5/5/2011).	  
COMMENTS	  WELCOME.	  PUBLISHED	  VERSION	  
AVAILABLE	  UPON	  REQUEST.	  
2	  
Acknowledgements	  
This	  essay	  was	  written	  while	  I	  was	  a	  doctoral	  scholar	  funded	  by	  the	  British	  
Society	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science.	  An	  earlier	  version	  was	  presented	  during	  a	  
session	  on	  microhistory	  at	  the	  International	  Society	  for	  Cultural	  History	  2010	  
Conference,	  held	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Turku,	  Finland.	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  comments	  
from	  the	  audience,	  especially	  those	  from	  Jacques	  Revel,	  Sven-­‐Erik	  Klinkmann,	  
and	  Sigurður	  Gylfi	  Magnússon.	  Gavin	  Maughfling	  read	  and	  commented	  on	  the	  
first	  and	  last	  drafts.	  
	  
	   	  
3	  
Margins	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  some	  micro	  cases	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  to	  macro	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1	   Introduction	  
How	  do	  micro	  cases	  in	  history	  lead	  us	  to	  surprising	  macro	  claims?	  I	  shall	  look	  at	  
two	  types	  of	  case	  studies	  that	  pose	  this	  challenge	  starkly.1	  The	  first	  type	  deals	  
with	  marginal	  groups,	  the	  second	  with	  monsters.	  Let	  me	  define	  these	  roughly.	  
Marginal	  groups	  are	  exceptions	  in	  a	  society.	  They	  are	  dismissed	  by	  the	  majority	  
as	  inferior	  or	  ill-­‐fitting.	  Their	  lives	  seem	  intelligible	  to	  others	  but	  also	  negligible.	  
Monsters,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  incomprehensible	  in	  some	  way	  to	  their	  society	  
and	  treated	  as	  such.	  Their	  behavior	  is	  extreme;	  others	  are	  tempted	  to	  call	  it	  evil	  
or	  inhuman.	  Of	  course,	  a	  monster	  can	  appear	  from	  the	  margins,	  and	  a	  society	  
may	  choose	  to	  ostracize	  its	  monsters	  as	  a	  group—I	  do	  not	  mean	  for	  these	  types	  
to	  exclude	  each	  other.	  I	  ask	  about	  both	  types:	  How	  are	  their	  lives,	  visible	  mostly	  
at	  the	  micro	  level,	  relevant	  to	  history	  at	  the	  more	  macro	  level?	  
	  
These	  exceptions	  and	  extremes	  seem	  to	  be	  unpromising	  material	  for	  any	  
generalization.	  Yet	  some	  historians	  are	  drawn	  to	  them.	  They	  reconstruct	  the	  
network	  of	  rules	  and	  practices	  through	  which	  society	  discriminates	  against	  a	  
marginal	  group.	  Or	  they	  record	  how	  a	  monster	  struggles	  against	  society—
sometimes	  erupting	  in	  early	  and	  violent	  rebellion,	  sometimes	  thriving	  in	  
surprising	  ways	  before	  capture	  and	  control,	  then	  languishing	  in	  mute	  isolation.	  
To	  infer	  from	  micro	  to	  macro:	  these	  relations	  between	  society	  and	  its	  margins	  or	  
monsters	  can	  cast	  light	  on	  that	  society.	  I	  note	  how	  often	  this	  metaphor	  of	  
‘casting	  light’	  recurs	  when	  historians	  discuss	  their	  case	  studies.	  It	  suggests	  that	  
                                                
1	   Two	   surveys	   of	   historical	   methods	   discuss	   this	   challenge	   more	   generally:	   Giovanni	   Levi,	   ‘On	  
Microhistory,’	   and	   Jim	   Sharpe,	   ‘History	   from	   Below,’	   both	   in	   New	   Perspectives	   on	   Historical	  
Writing,	   ed.	   Peter	   Burke,	   2nd	   ed.	   (Cambridge,	   UK:	   Polity	   Press,	   2001),	   97-­‐119,	   25-­‐42.	   I	   also	  
recommend	  Microhistory	  and	  the	  Lost	  Peoples	  of	  Europe,	  ed.	  Edward	  Muir	  and	  Guido	  Ruggiero	  
(Baltimore:	   Johns	   Hopkins	   University	   Press,	   1991)	   and	   Carlo	   Ginzburg,	   Clues,	   Myths,	   and	   the	  
Historical	   Method,	   transl.	   John	   Tedeschi	   and	   Anne	   C.	   Tedeschi	   (Baltimore:	   Johns	   Hopkins	  
University	  Press,	  1992).	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the	  micro	  does	  not	  illuminate	  the	  macro	  straightforwardly.	  Such	  light,	  when	  cast	  
on	  a	  backdrop	  of	  already	  vague	  social	  and	  cultural	  contours,	  needs	  to	  be	  
interpreted.	  
	  
In	  this	  essay,	  I	  propose	  six	  interpretive	  norms	  to	  guide	  these	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  
inferences.	  My	  strategy	  is	  to	  analyze	  two	  case	  studies	  in	  Richard	  Cobb’s	  
Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  which	  are	  admired	  by	  other	  historians,	  even	  
those	  with	  different	  methodological	  and	  ideological	  leanings.2	  His	  studies	  try	  to	  
make	  sense	  of	  the	  strange	  lives	  led	  by	  a	  band	  of	  violent	  bandits	  and	  a	  semi-­‐
literate	  provincial	  terrorist.	  They	  offer	  different	  surprises	  about	  the	  revolutionary	  
era:	  French	  society	  was	  even	  less	  like	  the	  margins	  than	  it	  had	  asserted,	  and	  more	  
like	  the	  monsters	  than	  it	  had	  assumed.	  First,	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  these	  surprises	  
involve	  new	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences	  about	  French	  society’s	  self-­‐image,	  
situation,	  mentality,	  and	  intelligibility.	  Some	  of	  them	  challenge	  our	  conception	  of	  
a	  macro	  claim.	  Then	  I	  will	  identify	  four	  risks	  in	  Cobb’s	  inferences	  and	  the	  rigors	  
that	  he	  applies	  to	  manage	  those	  risks.	  	  
	  
A	  worry	  arises	  immediately.	  Might	  the	  crafting	  of	  case	  studies	  be	  akin	  to	  an	  art?	  
If	  so,	  is	  this	  art	  amenable	  to	  analysis?3	  Let	  me	  stress	  that	  my	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  codify	  
microhistory’s	  practices,	  but	  to	  clarify	  a	  historian’s	  method—a	  method	  that,	  I	  
claim,	  shares	  some	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  tactics	  of	  microhistory	  and	  casts	  light	  on	  their	  
problems.	  When	  I	  came	  by	  Cobb’s	  book	  two	  years	  ago,	  I	  was	  struck	  by	  his	  voice.	  
Its	  compelling	  tone	  is	  hard	  to	  capture:	  highly	  personal,	  frank	  with	  prejudices,	  but	  
rich	  with	  empathy	  for	  his	  subjects	  and	  authority	  over	  his	  sources.	  Cobb	  has	  been	  
praised	  too	  for	  his	  novelist’s	  imagination	  and	  eye	  for	  detail.	  This	  praise	  is	  not	  
                                                
2	   Richard	   Cobb,	   Reactions	   to	   the	   French	   Revolution	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   1972),	  
chaps.	  3-­‐5.	   I	  have	   learned	  from	  three	  essays	  by	  Cobb’s	   former	  pupils:	  Martyn	  Lyons,	   ‘Cobb	  and	  
the	  Historians,’	  in	  Beyond	  the	  Terror:	  Essays	  in	  French	  Regional	  and	  Social	  History	  1794–1815,	  ed.	  
Gwynne	  Lewis	  and	  Colin	  Lucas	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  1-­‐20;	  Gwynne	  
Lewis,	  ‘Richard	  Cobb,	  1917–1996,’	  History	  Workshop	  Journal	  42	  (1996),	  244-­‐247;	  and	  Colin	  Jones,	  
‘Olwen	  Hufton’s	   ‘Poor’,	  Richard	  Cobb’s	   ‘People’,	  and	  the	  Notions	  of	  the	   longue	  durée	   in	  French	  
Revolutionary	  Historiography,’	  Past	  and	  Present	  1	  (2006),	  178-­‐203.	  
	  
3	  This	  worry	  also	  crops	  up	  when	  case	  studies	  are	  used	   in	   the	  social	   sciences.	  See	   John	  Gerring,	  




wrongheaded,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  show	  how	  the	  autobiographical,	  literary,	  and	  
historiographical	  interests	  of	  his	  case	  studies	  are	  linked.	  I	  want	  to	  clarify	  this	  link	  
by	  making	  explicit	  those	  historiographical	  norms	  in	  Cobb’s	  method	  that	  draw	  on	  
autobiographical	  and	  literary	  interests.	  	  
	  
To	  do	  so,	  I	  must	  simplify,	  with	  an	  outsider’s	  eye,	  the	  texture	  of	  his	  case	  studies.	  I	  
speak	  of	  the	  macro	  level	  in	  these	  case	  studies,	  even	  though	  they	  refer	  to	  a	  range	  
of	  macro	  levels.	  I	  neglect	  their	  links	  with	  other	  historiographical	  and	  ideological	  
debates	  about	  the	  French	  Revolution.	  Instead,	  I	  draw	  on	  what	  others	  say	  about	  
microhistory’s	  use	  of	  the	  ‘significant	  clue,’	  the	  ‘telling	  detail,’	  and	  the	  
‘exceptional	  normal.’4	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  translate	  what	  I	  have	  learned	  about	  these	  
provocative	  abstractions	  into	  concrete	  applications.	  My	  blunt	  approach—listing	  
every	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inference	  and	  interpretive	  norm	  implied,	  however	  obvious	  
to	  the	  historian—brings	  two	  benefits.	  First,	  it	  makes	  available	  to	  the	  new	  
historian	  and	  the	  non-­‐historian	  such	  inferences	  and	  norms.	  Second,	  it	  highlights	  
to	  the	  historian	  some	  aspects	  of	  historiography	  that	  most	  resist	  codification.	  
	  
2	   Margins	  
On	  November	  4,	  1799,	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  in	  Chartres	  drew	  up	  an	  indictment	  
of	  118	  persons.	  They	  were	  members	  and	  accomplices	  of	  the	  bande	  d’Orgères—a	  
gang	  of	  bandits	  charged	  with	  ninety-­‐five	  murderous	  operations	  between	  1791	  
and	  1799.	  The	  band	  lived	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  Beauce	  and	  terrorized	  the	  
countryside	  near	  Chartres,	  though	  it	  used	  Paris	  to	  recruit	  children	  and	  ventured	  
at	  least	  twice	  to	  the	  Seine-­‐et-­‐Marne.	  It	  targeted	  farms,	  inns,	  and	  shops.	  The	  band	  
was	  cohesive	  and	  organized,	  forming	  what	  Cobb	  calls	  ‘a	  Counter-­‐Society’	  and	  ‘an	  
                                                
4	   See,	   for	   instance,	   Ginzburg,	   ‘Clues:	   Roots	   of	   an	   Evidential	   Paradigm’;	   Carlo	   Ginzburg,	  
‘Microhistory:	   Two	   or	   Three	   Things	   That	   I	   Know	   about	   It,’	   Critical	   Inquiry	   20	   (1993),	   10-­‐35;	  
Jacques	   Revel,	   ‘Microanalysis	   and	   the	   Construction	   of	   the	   Social,’	   in	   Histories:	   French	  
Constructions	   of	   the	   Past,	   ed.	   Jacques	   Revel	   and	   Lynn	   Hunt,	   transl.	   Arthur	   Goldhammer	   (New	  
York:	  The	  New	  Press,	  1996),	  492-­‐502;	  and	  Levi,	  ‘On	  Microhistory,’	  97-­‐119.	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Anti-­‐State.’5	  Most	  members	  had	  criminal	  pasts;	  many	  had	  family	  and	  lovers	  in	  
the	  band.	  To	  collect	  information,	  some	  worked	  temporarily	  for	  farmers	  and	  
bribed	  locals.	  Others	  took	  part	  in	  violent	  robberies	  and	  murders.	  Stolen	  goods	  
were	  processed,	  often	  by	  the	  women,	  then	  dispersed	  by	  those	  disguised	  as	  
peddlers	  and	  merchants.	  Cobb	  uses	  police	  and	  judicial	  archives	  in	  the	  provinces	  
to	  reconstruct	  the	  bandits’	  lives	  in	  vivid	  detail.	  To	  pick	  just	  one	  example	  that	  
sticks	  in	  my	  mind:	  he	  notes	  that	  Saturday	  was	  ‘often	  the	  day	  most	  favored	  for	  
their	  operations,	  thus	  ensuring	  an	  agreeable	  Sunday	  sharing	  out	  the	  spoils,	  in	  
their	  new	  finery,	  in	  the	  auberge.’6	  
	  
I	  cannot	  do	  justice	  here	  to	  Cobb’s	  detective	  work.	  My	  interest	  is	  more	  narrowly	  
historiographical:	  How	  does	  his	  micro	  study	  of	  the	  band	  contribute	  to	  our	  macro	  
understanding	  of	  French	  society?	  We	  need	  to	  test	  if	  his	  description	  of	  life	  on	  the	  
margins	  tells	  us	  anything	  valuable	  about	  life	  among	  the	  majority.	  This	  test	  faces	  
two	  prima	  facie	  difficulties.	  First,	  there	  are	  no	  obvious	  causal	  connections	  
between	  the	  band	  and	  the	  Revolution.	  It	  ‘cannot	  be	  said	  either	  to	  have	  
influenced,	  or	  been	  influenced	  by,	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Revolution.’7	  At	  most,	  
economic	  distress	  during	  the	  Revolution	  supplied	  the	  band	  with	  ready	  recruits.	  
Second,	  the	  band	  lived	  under	  its	  own	  code	  and	  hierarchy.	  It	  seemed	  to	  relish	  its	  
separate	  status	  as	  an	  anti-­‐state.	  
	  
2.1	   Identifications	  and	  Interactions	  
I	  find	  two	  ways	  to	  make	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  first	  looks	  at	  
how	  the	  marginal	  group	  was	  identified	  by	  outsiders,	  the	  second	  at	  how	  it	  
interacted	  with	  them.	  Identifications	  can	  be	  revealing.	  The	  terms	  by	  which	  a	  
marginal	  group	  was	  identified,	  then	  dismissed	  as	  exceptional,	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  
majority’s	  self-­‐image.	  Studying	  the	  prosecutor’s	  1799	  indictment,	  Cobb	  describes	  
                                                
5	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  10.	  
	  
6	  Ibid.,	  196.	  But	  see	  206n.	  
	  
7	  Ibid.,	  125.	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the	  band	  as	  ‘a	  society	  that	  was	  able	  to	  live	  outside	  all	  the	  usual	  terms	  of	  
reference	  of	  normal	  behavior—a	  body,	  in	  fact,	  that	  was	  complete	  in	  itself,	  with	  
its	  own	  codes,	  providing	  for	  its	  own	  lusty	  pleasures	  and	  even	  organized	  for	  the	  
future,	  with	  the	  provision	  for	  the	  education	  of	  its	  younger	  members.’8	  This	  
prosecutor	  condemned	  the	  band	  for	  its	  ‘habits	  of	  crime,	  idleness	  and	  profligacy.’	  
He	  charged	  that	  children	  as	  young	  as	  10	  to	  12	  had	  been	  recruited	  and	  trained	  to	  
be	  thieves	  and	  killers.	  We	  can	  infer	  that	  these	  habits	  were	  not,	  from	  the	  
majority’s	  point	  of	  view,	  normal	  behavior.9	  They	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  its	  self-­‐image:	  
that	  body	  of	  assumptions	  about	  itself	  that	  guards	  its	  identity	  and	  guides	  its	  
action,	  including	  its	  judgment	  of	  others.	  
	  
Our	  initial	  conclusion	  offers	  no	  surprise.	  It	  is	  even	  a	  little	  disappointing.	  But	  we	  
can	  draw	  a	  more	  subtle	  inference	  from	  Cobb’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  band	  was	  
‘complete	  in	  itself.’	  What	  justifies	  this	  insistence?	  This	  marginal	  group	  was	  similar	  
in	  some	  ways	  to	  the	  majority:	  it	  had	  codes	  of	  behavior,	  as	  well	  as	  policies	  about	  
pleasure	  and	  posterity.	  It	  prized	  women	  with	  good	  looks.	  The	  band	  formed	  ‘a	  
complete	  society,	  with	  family	  relationships	  and	  in	  which	  women	  had	  a	  major	  part	  
to	  play.’10	  It	  even	  divided	  the	  territory	  of	  this	  anti-­‐state	  into	  départements	  and	  
cantons—a	  mocking	  semblance	  of	  the	  French	  state.11	  Often	  its	  most	  striking	  
differences	  from	  the	  majority	  obscure	  similarities	  of	  interest	  and	  purpose.	  We	  
are	  so	  outraged	  by	  children	  being	  trained	  in	  theft	  that	  we	  overlook	  how	  odd	  it	  is	  
for	  bandits	  to	  plan	  assiduously	  to	  educate	  their	  young.	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  diminish	  
those	  differences	  that	  had	  disturbed	  the	  prosecutor	  and	  the	  majority	  he	  
represents.	  My	  point	  is	  that	  the	  band	  could	  be	  cast	  as	  exceptional	  only	  by	  
stressing	  such	  differences	  and	  suppressing	  substantial	  similarities.	  This	  reveals	  
how	  part	  of	  that	  majority’s	  self-­‐image	  was	  constructed	  out	  of	  a	  blend	  of	  
                                                
8	  Ibid.,	  190.	  
	  
9	   This	   mode	   of	   inference	   is	   noted	   in	   Edward	   Muir,	   ‘Introduction:	   Observing	   Trifles,’	   in	  
Microhistory	   and	   the	   Lost	   Peoples	   of	   Europe,	   ed.	   Edward	  Muir	   and	  Guido	  Ruggiero	   (Baltimore:	  
Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  xiv.	  
	  
10	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  192.	  
	  
11	  Ibid.,	  190.	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similarities	  and	  differences.	  I	  think	  of	  it	  as	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  macro	  claim;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  
claim	  about	  the	  prosecutor’s	  intention	  or	  the	  image’s	  function.	  Its	  significance	  
depends	  on	  whether	  that	  construction	  can	  be	  used	  to	  clarify	  other	  macro	  
phenomena.	  
	  
What	  about	  interactions?	  From	  these,	  we	  can	  deduce	  a	  range	  of	  macro	  claims	  
about	  society’s	  situation.	  Some	  confirm	  old	  hypotheses,	  while	  others	  raise	  new	  
ones.	  For	  instance,	  the	  band’s	  interactions	  with	  outsiders	  indicate	  an	  ‘elaborate	  
chain	  of	  complicity’	  in	  its	  community.12	  It	  used	  many	  middlemen.	  Innkeepers	  and	  
local	  tenants	  provided	  information	  about	  wealthy	  victims.	  Seamstresses,	  clothes’	  
salesmen,	  cattle-­‐merchants,	  horse-­‐dealers,	  counterfeiters,	  jewelers,	  and	  
locksmiths	  disposed	  of	  stolen	  goods.13	  The	  bandits	  ‘returned,	  again	  and	  again,	  to	  
the	  same	  inns	  .	  .	  .	  to	  change,	  to	  eat	  and	  drink	  and	  play	  cards,	  while	  awaiting	  the	  
arrival	  of	  customers	  to	  whom	  they	  could	  sell	  the	  clothes	  and	  stuff	  they	  had	  
stolen—when	  they	  did	  not	  sell	  them,	  quite	  openly	  at	  the	  counter,	  to	  the	  
landlord.’14	  	  
	  
Their	  insouciance	  hints	  at	  how	  easily	  crime	  nested,	  in	  ‘full	  sight,’	  within	  a	  rural	  
community	  in	  revolutionary	  France.	  The	  community	  was	  attuned	  to	  this	  
criminality—terrorized	  into	  silence,	  but	  sometimes	  filled	  with	  sympathy	  and	  
admiration.15	  Lest	  this	  diagnosis	  seem	  fanciful,	  Cobb	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  band	  
enjoyed	  at	  least	  ten	  years	  of	  virtual	  impunity,	  despite	  their	  crude	  and	  loud	  
operations.	  ‘The	  amazing	  thing	  is	  that	  they	  lasted	  as	  long	  as	  they	  did.’16	  Beyond	  
the	  band	  and	  its	  immediate	  accomplices,	  there	  was	  probably	  ‘a	  far	  wider	  circle	  at	  
least	  of	  toleration	  or	  even	  semi-­‐complicity,’	  which	  the	  police	  could	  not	  breach.17	  
                                                
12	  Ibid.,	  189.	  
	  
13	  Ibid.,	  191.	  
	  
14	  Ibid.,	  206.	  
	  
15	  Ibid.,	  189.	  
	  
16	  Ibid.,	  207.	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  Ibid.,	  186.	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Outside	  reactions	  to	  the	  band	  can	  also	  be	  instructive.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  these	  
bandits	  became	  ‘une	  affaire	  d’État’	  for	  the	  Directory.18	  After	  150	  suspects	  were	  
rounded	  up	  in	  1798,	  the	  investigating	  director	  feared	  that	  the	  band’s	  allies	  would	  
attack	  the	  prison.	  The	  Minister	  of	  War	  had	  to	  dispatch	  a	  garrison	  during	  the	  trial	  
to	  prevent	  a	  break-­‐out.19	  Were	  these	  only	  personal	  worries?	  There	  is	  evidence	  
that	  they	  express	  a	  wider	  climate	  of	  fear.	  Although	  the	  bandits	  committed	  crimes	  
in	  several	  jurisdictions,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  and	  local	  officials	  were	  keen	  that	  
they	  be	  tried	  together,	  in	  order	  to	  impress	  local	  opinion	  and	  ‘exploit	  to	  the	  full	  
such	  a	  signal	  victory	  for	  public	  order.’20	  From	  these	  reactions,	  we	  can	  infer	  a	  
more	  general	  vulnerability	  in	  the	  police	  and	  judicial	  authorities	  of	  this	  period.	  
	  
Do	  such	  data	  about	  fears	  and	  reactions	  belong	  at	  the	  macro	  level?	  We	  may	  be	  
tempted	  to	  dismiss	  them	  as	  merely	  psychological,	  as	  though	  they	  were	  somehow	  
less	  real	  or	  reliable	  than	  data	  about	  crime	  figures,	  police	  numbers,	  and	  judicial	  
structures.	  Two	  reminders	  may	  help	  here.	  Institutional	  strength	  is	  a	  partly	  
psychological	  attribute,	  so	  fears	  can	  be	  legitimate	  data	  for	  assessing	  it.21	  
Psychological	  data	  can	  also	  be	  constrained	  or	  corrected.	  We	  may	  discover,	  for	  
instance,	  that	  the	  authorities’	  fears	  were	  limited	  to	  the	  countryside,	  not	  
widespread	  in	  all	  of	  France.	  Or	  we	  may	  find	  a	  more	  plausible	  interpretation	  of	  their	  
seemingly	  fearful	  behavior.	  
	  
2.2	   Spurious	  Identifications	  
Let	  me	  address	  two	  risks	  in	  these	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences.	  The	  first	  risk:	  What	  
if	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  marginal	  group	  is	  spurious?	  Suppose	  that	  the	  authorities	  
                                                                                                                                 
	  
18	  Ibid.,	  182n.	  
	  
19	  Ibid.,	  208.	  
	  
20	  Ibid.,	  209.	  
	  
21	  Cobb	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  about	  the	  role	  of	  psychology	  in	  macro	  questions	  about	  subsistence.	  
See	  Gwynne	  Lewis,	  ‘Review:	  The	  People’s	  Armies	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,’	  The	  Historical	  Journal	  
32	  (1989),	  464;	  and	  Jones,	  ‘Olwen	  Hufton’s	  ‘Poor’,’	  185.	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had	  been	  mistaken	  about	  the	  band’s	  composition	  and	  behavior.	  Indeed,	  as	  Cobb	  
notes,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  deliberately	  inflated	  the	  affair	  by	  ‘creating	  a	  sort	  of	  
amalgame’	  of	  118	  suspects	  and	  ‘alleged	  activities.’22	  Unfortunately,	  historians	  
have	  no	  easy	  way	  to	  verify	  both.	  They	  rely	  on	  police	  and	  judicial	  records	  for	  
almost	  all	  data	  on	  the	  band.	  	  
	  
This	  need	  not	  matter.	  We	  are	  partly	  interested	  in	  how	  the	  majority	  identifies	  the	  
band	  because	  its	  terms	  of	  identification	  help	  us	  to	  deduce	  the	  majority’s	  self-­‐
image.	  What	  matters	  here	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  behavior	  that	  the	  majority	  regarded	  
as	  abnormal.	  We	  do	  not	  need	  to	  know	  exactly	  how	  many	  were	  in	  the	  band	  or	  
how	  abnormally	  it	  behaved.	  We	  can	  use	  the	  official	  amalgam	  like	  a	  
historiographical	  scaffold,	  eventually	  to	  be	  dismantled.	  But	  this	  will	  not	  work	  for	  
all	  our	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences.	  Take,	  for	  instance,	  the	  new	  macro	  claim	  about	  
how	  the	  majority’s	  self-­‐image	  was	  constructed.	  To	  derive	  a	  useful	  version	  of	  this	  
claim,	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  discover	  the	  majority’s	  actual	  similarities	  with	  the	  
band,	  which	  were	  obscured	  by	  the	  focus	  on	  their	  alleged	  differences.	  If	  so,	  we	  
must	  identify	  the	  band’s	  actual	  composition	  and	  behavior.	  Moreover,	  it	  may	  be	  
useful	  to	  compare	  these	  with	  the	  majority’s	  allegations.	  If	  they	  diverge	  
substantially,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  majority	  had	  a	  poor	  grasp	  of	  reality	  and	  that	  
its	  self-­‐image	  was	  partly	  built	  on	  fantasy.	  
	  
How	  then	  can	  a	  historian	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  spurious	  identification?	  Cobb	  
relies,	  implicitly,	  on	  a	  norm	  of	  coherence:	  The	  macro-­‐level	  identification	  of	  a	  
marginal	  group	  is	  strengthened	  if	  we	  find	  a	  surprising	  micro-­‐level	  coherence	  in	  
its	  behavior.	  This	  coherence	  comes	  from	  making	  sense	  of	  behavior	  that	  looks,	  at	  
first	  sight,	  to	  be	  inconsistent,	  unintelligent,	  or	  unintelligible.	  Here	  are	  three	  
examples.	  First,	  to	  an	  outsider,	  the	  band’s	  spurts	  of	  violence	  did	  not	  appear	  
‘consistent	  or	  calculated.’23	  Sometimes	  they	  killed	  entire	  households;	  other	  times	  
they	  spared	  families	  or	  individuals.	  They	  seemed	  to	  rape	  and	  murder	  at	  whim,	  
                                                
22	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  Appendix	  C;	  181n	  and	  186n.	  
	  
23	  Ibid.,	  198.	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rather	  than	  following	  any	  policy.	  There	  was	  no	  ‘social	  protest’	  since	  the	  poor	  
were	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  targeted	  as	  the	  rich.24	  But	  this	  apparent	  arbitrariness	  
made	  sense	  within	  the	  band,	  creating	  a	  ‘loose	  kind	  of	  hierarchy’	  among	  members	  
based	  on	  their	  cruelty	  and	  physical	  prowess.25	  Arbitrariness	  in	  unleashing	  
violence	  was	  cultivated	  as	  a	  virile	  sign	  of	  cruelty.	  Second,	  the	  band’s	  actions	  
often	  seemed	  unintelligent.	  After	  an	  operation,	  they	  would	  show	  up	  at	  the	  inn,	  
‘in	  their	  new	  clothes,	  spending	  freely	  and	  boasting	  in	  their	  cups.’26	  Their	  last	  
leader,	  le	  Rouge	  d’Auneau,	  when	  captured,	  was	  happy	  to	  boast	  about	  their	  
operation’s	  details.27	  Although	  these	  flamboyant	  actions	  might	  look	  foolish	  to	  
outsiders,	  they	  expressed	  the	  band’s	  pride	  and	  humor	  in	  flouting	  authority.	  
Third,	  younger	  members	  seemed	  inexplicably	  preoccupied	  by	  personal	  
appearance.28	  The	  men	  took	  care	  to	  dress	  well,	  sometimes	  at	  high	  risk;	  the	  
women	  were	  rewarded	  with	  fine	  clothing.	  Silver	  shoe	  buckles	  were	  prized.	  They	  
stole	  far	  more	  clothing	  than	  other	  valuables.	  This	  was	  partly	  because	  clothing	  
was	  easier	  to	  dispose	  of	  quickly.	  But	  band	  members	  were	  also	  proving	  
themselves	  within	  a	  ‘recognized	  hierarchy	  in	  a	  society	  of	  their	  own	  making,’	  in	  
which	  their	  appearance	  had	  an	  exaggerated	  significance.29	  	  
	  
Drawing	  on	  these	  interpretations,	  Cobb	  argues	  that	  the	  band’s	  behavior	  often	  
had	  a	  ‘concealed	  symbolism’	  that	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  need	  and	  other	  ‘purely	  
material	  terms.’30	  This	  micro-­‐level	  behavior	  had	  a	  strong	  and	  separate	  
coherence.	  It	  reinforces	  our	  identification	  of	  the	  band	  as	  a	  marginal	  group,	  
bearing	  ‘its	  own	  signs	  of	  recognition,	  its	  own	  language,	  and	  its	  own	  shared	  
                                                
24	  Ibid.,	  205.	  
	  
25	  Ibid.,	  200.	  
	  
26	  Ibid.,	  205.	  
	  
27	  Ibid.,	  208.	  
	  
28	  Ibid.,	  200.	  
	  
29	  Ibid.,	  204.	  
	  
30	  Ibid.,	  201.	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assumptions.’31	  Such	  differences	  show	  that	  French	  society	  was	  even	  less	  like	  this	  
marginal	  group	  than	  it	  had	  asserted.	  	  
	  
2.3	   Insignificant	  Interactions	  
Any	  unexpected	  coherence	  we	  find	  in	  a	  marginal	  group’s	  behavior	  reinforces	  its	  
independence	  from	  the	  majority.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  tends	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  
second	  risk	  in	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences.	  What	  if	  the	  interactions	  between	  a	  
marginal	  group	  and	  its	  society	  prove	  to	  be	  insignificant?	  At	  first	  sight,	  this	  seems	  
to	  threaten	  Cobb’s	  case	  study.	  He	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  band	  was	  an	  anti-­‐society	  
that	  had	  repudiated	  the	  Revolution	  and	  its	  workings.	  To	  the	  band	  and	  other	  such	  
marginal	  groups,	  the	  Revolution	  was	  ‘a	  magnificent	  irrelevance.’32	  If	  the	  
Revolution	  had	  been	  so	  irrelevant	  to	  them,	  how	  can	  studying	  the	  band	  tell	  us	  
anything	  interesting	  about	  French	  society?	  
	  
Cobb’s	  ingenious	  move	  is	  to	  invest	  new	  macro-­‐level	  meanings	  in	  this	  very	  
irrelevance.	  It	  means,	  first	  of	  all,	  that	  there	  were	  limits	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  
authority’s	  power	  in	  France.33	  Despite	  the	  Revolution’s	  ambition	  to	  impose	  its	  
vision	  on	  France,	  its	  agents	  could	  not	  control	  the	  band	  and	  similar	  groups	  living	  
in	  the	  margins	  of	  society.	  Second,	  these	  limits	  left	  enough	  room	  for	  marginal	  
groups	  to	  resist	  authority	  in	  surprisingly	  productive	  ways.	  The	  band	  was	  able	  to	  
establish	  ‘its	  own	  codes,	  its	  own	  hierarchy,	  its	  own	  language,	  its	  own	  sense	  of	  
time,	  and	  its	  own	  calendar’—in	  effect,	  to	  create	  its	  ‘own	  history,’	  which	  lasted	  
longer	  than	  any	  revolutionary	  regime	  at	  the	  center.34	  A	  norm	  of	  challenge	  is	  at	  
work	  here:	  A	  micro-­‐level	  relation	  is	  significant	  if	  it	  challenges	  what	  we	  find	  
meaningful	  at	  the	  macro	  level.	  To	  highlight	  these	  new	  meanings,	  Cobb	  has	  to	  
                                                
31	  Ibid.,	  202.	  
	  
32	   Ibid.,	   125.	   He	   begins	   this	   theme	   on	   13	   and	   returns	   to	   it	   on	   163,	   in	   a	   section	   entitled	   ‘The	  
Irrelevance	   of	   the	   Revolution.’	   Chapter	   4	   explores	   the	   complicated	   and	   contradictory	   ways	   in	  
which	  ‘it	  was	  possible	  almost	  to	  live	  outside	  the	  Revolution’	  (130).	  
	  
33	  Ibid.,	  126.	  
	  
34	  Ibid.,	  125	  and	  178.	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orient	  our	  perspective	  even	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  toward	  the	  possibilities	  in	  
marginal	  lives.	  ‘For	  the	  Revolution	  exists	  as	  much	  through	  their	  narrow,	  
unremarkable	  lives,	  or	  in	  their	  violent	  bloody	  enterprises,	  as	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  
great.’35	  This	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  underlies	  his	  entire	  book;	  to	  me,	  it	  indicates	  
how	  deeply,	  and	  oddly,	  a	  democratic	  concern	  has	  found	  its	  way	  into	  Cobb’s	  
historical	  perspective.	  
	  
But	  how	  can	  historians	  ensure	  that	  the	  audience	  shares	  their	  perspective?	  One	  
tempting	  strategy	  is	  to	  impose	  on	  that	  audience	  any	  new	  meanings	  that	  they	  
have	  found	  at	  the	  macro	  level.	  They	  might	  add,	  reasonably,	  that	  the	  proof	  of	  
their	  worth	  lies	  in	  the	  historical	  interpretations	  that	  they	  enable.	  I	  think	  Cobb	  
chooses	  a	  subtler	  strategy.	  He	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  policy	  of	  restraint:	  ‘It	  is	  not	  always	  
possible,	  or	  even	  desirable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  historical	  method,	  to	  bring	  
out	  the	  pointers	  and	  establish	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  and	  private	  
acts.’36	  Instead	  he	  invites	  the	  audience	  into	  his	  perspective,	  always	  allowing	  that	  
his	  invitation—together	  with	  its	  package	  of	  new	  inferences	  and	  meanings—can	  
be	  declined.	  Here	  is	  a	  passage	  on	  the	  band	  that	  illustrates	  this	  open	  
historiographical	  attitude:	  
There	  was	  a	  certain	  logic	  in	  the	  position	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  bande	  
d’Orgères	  and	  of	  many	  other	  similar	  groups,	  in	  deciding	  to	  create	  their	  
own	  history	  (and	  myth),	  in	  a	  narrative	  of	  violence,	  pillage,	  and	  murder.	  
They	  at	  least	  were,	  for	  a	  time,	  masters	  both	  of	  the	  present	  and	  of	  the	  
immediate	  future;	  and	  no	  one	  can	  lightly	  dismiss	  a	  narrative,	  however	  
anarchical	  and	  violent	  that,	  thanks	  to	  their	  efforts,	  to	  the	  fears	  that	  they	  
inspired,	  and	  to	  the	  wide	  extent	  of	  the	  complicity	  that	  they	  enjoyed,	  they	  
succeeded	  in	  keeping	  going	  for	  nearly	  ten	  years.	  .	  .	  .	  37	  
                                                
35	  Ibid.,	  131.	  He	  describes,	  on	  14,	  his	  goal	  to	  put	  that	  Revolution	  ‘in	  a	  more	  human	  perspective.’	  
	  
36	   Ibid.,	  130.	  On	  92,	  he	  praises	  a	  book	  that	   is	   ‘good	  almost	  by	  accident,	  by	  default’:	   ‘The	  author	  
does	  not	  always	  realise	  just	  what	  a	  gold	  mine	  he	  has	  dug	  out,	  he	  is	  unwilling	  to	  obtrude	  .	  .	  .	  and	  
perhaps	  we	  should	  be	  grateful	  to	  him	  for	  having	  been	  hesitant	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  pointers.’	  
	  
37	  Ibid.,	  178.	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By	  speaking	  of	  a	  ‘logic,’	  Cobb	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  strong	  and	  separate	  coherence	  in	  
the	  band’s	  behavior.	  This	  coherence	  forms	  a	  ‘narrative’	  with	  its	  own	  new	  
meanings,	  which	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  ‘lightly’	  dismissed.	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  deny	  
that	  this	  narrative	  can	  be	  legitimately	  dismissed.	  The	  audience	  is	  left	  to	  assess,	  
for	  itself,	  what	  the	  costs	  of	  such	  a	  dismissal	  might	  be	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  willing	  to	  
bear	  them.	  This	  openness	  is	  a	  striking	  aspect	  of	  Cobb’s	  historical	  method.	  I	  see	  it	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  generosity.	  To	  his	  audience,	  he	  offers	  an	  invitation	  to	  explore	  some	  
marginal	  lives	  and	  engage	  in	  the	  new	  meanings	  that	  he	  finds	  in	  them.	  To	  those	  
marginal	  lives,	  he	  offers	  a	  chance,	  ‘whenever	  possible,’	  for	  them	  ‘to	  witness	  for	  
themselves,	  in	  their	  own	  language.’38	  	  
	  
This	  attitude	  explains	  another	  unusual	  aspect	  of	  Cobb’s	  method.	  He	  is	  frank	  
about	  his	  prejudices	  and	  sentiments.	  Of	  those	  revolutionary	  elites	  whom	  he	  
ignores:	  he	  must	  ‘admit	  to	  an	  extreme	  repulsion	  for	  Robespierre’	  and	  ‘confess	  to	  
a	  certain	  inability	  to	  understand	  the	  motives	  of	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  exercise	  
power’	  during	  a	  Revolution.39	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  finds	  a	  strange	  reassurance	  
in	  those	  marginal	  lives	  to	  whom	  he	  draws	  our	  attention.	  It	  is	  ‘reassuring	  to	  think	  
of	  a	  great	  Revolution	  as	  a	  magnificent	  irrelevance.’40	  To	  him,	  studying	  this	  
irrelevance	  is	  
a	  reassuring,	  even	  a	  hope-­‐giving	  exercise,	  if	  one	  can	  take	  one’s	  eyes	  off	  so	  
much	  random	  killing	  and	  forget	  the	  costs,	  in	  personal	  and	  family	  terms,	  of	  
murder	  and	  maiming.	  For	  it	  illustrates	  the	  limitless	  capacity	  of	  the	  
individual	  to	  live	  out	  of	  reach	  of	  terrible	  and	  dangerous	  events	  and	  to	  
shut	  the	  door	  on	  the	  shouting,	  the	  screams,	  the	  roars,	  the	  howls,	  the	  ugly	  
surge	  of	  collective	  commitment	  and	  of	  vengeful	  lust.	  .	  .	  .	  41	  
                                                
38	  Ibid.,	  131.	  
	  
39	  Ibid.,	  5-­‐6.	  See	  also	  12,	  where	  he	  mentions	  being	  ‘afraid	  of	  him.’	  
	  
40	  Ibid.,	  125.	  Jones,	  ‘Olwen	  Hufton’s	  ‘Poor’,’	  184,	  notes	  how	  often	  the	  term	  ‘reassuring’	  recurs	  in	  
Cobb’s	  writings.	  
	  
41	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  126.	  Lyons,	  ‘Cobb	  and	  the	  Historians,’	  14,	  finds	  this	  
sympathy	  to	  be	  ‘very	  questionable	  in	  practical,	  let	  alone	  moral	  terms.’	  I	  do	  not	  disagree,	  but	  want	  
to	  ask	  why	  Cobb	  deliberately	  exposes	  himself	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  criticism.	  
15	  
Why	  does	  Cobb	  resort	  to	  this	  bluntly	  personal,	  even	  confessional,	  talk	  of	  
repulsion	  and	  reassurance?	  He	  cannot	  be	  asking	  us	  to	  share	  his	  prejudices	  and	  
sentiments.	  (If	  he	  did,	  why	  spell	  them	  out	  so	  obviously	  as	  prejudices	  and	  
sentiments?)	  I	  think	  he	  means	  to	  provoke	  a	  change	  in	  his	  audience’s	  perspective.	  
Without	  this	  change,	  the	  new	  macro-­‐level	  inferences	  and	  meanings	  he	  draws	  
from	  the	  marginal	  lives	  will	  not	  take	  hold.	  But,	  following	  the	  norm	  of	  restraint,	  
Cobb	  does	  not	  want	  to	  impose	  his	  perspective	  on	  us	  or	  assume	  that	  we	  already	  
share	  it.	  Instead,	  by	  recording	  the	  prejudices	  and	  sentiments	  that	  partly	  paved	  
his	  way	  into	  that	  perspective,	  he	  implicitly	  invites	  us	  to	  find	  our	  own	  ways	  into	  it.	  
This	  autobiographical	  honesty,	  therefore,	  complements	  his	  historiographical	  
restraint.	  Both	  norms	  ought	  to	  be	  tested	  further	  by	  others:	  Might	  they	  reduce	  
the	  danger	  that	  microhistorians	  will	  replace	  the	  grand	  narrative	  they	  attack	  with	  
another	  of	  their	  own	  making?42	  
	  
3.	  Monsters	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  look	  at	  Cobb’s	  use	  of	  monsters.	  How	  does	  the	  history	  of	  a	  
monster’s	  life	  give	  us	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  its	  society?	  Take	  this	  example	  in	  
his	  book:	  Nicolas	  Guénot,	  an	  ‘unusual,	  even	  interesting,	  monster’	  from	  the	  
provinces.43	  Drawing	  on	  a	  biography	  by	  Claude	  Hohl,	  Cobb	  describes	  a	  desperate	  
life	  that	  started	  in	  Voutenay.	  Before	  he	  was	  17,	  Guénot	  worked	  as	  a	  flotteur,	  
rolling	  logs	  in	  the	  rivers	  to	  Paris.	  This	  was	  a	  dangerous	  trade	  conducted	  in	  an	  
‘exceptionally	  brutal’	  community,	  where	  rich	  timber	  merchants	  ruthlessly	  
exploited	  everyone.44	  Guénot	  made	  his	  way	  to	  Paris,	  where	  he	  survived	  as	  a	  
police	  informer	  and	  underworld	  auxiliary.	  At	  21,	  he	  enlisted	  in	  the	  Gardes	  
Françaises,	  notorious	  as	  ‘the	  most	  brutal,	  violent,	  and	  undisciplined	  regiment	  of	  
                                                                                                                                 
	  
42	  Sigurður	  Gylfi	  Magnússon	  highlighted	  this	  danger	  during	  a	  conference	  at	  which	  this	  essay	  was	  
presented.	  
	  
43	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  97.	  Throughout	  this	  section,	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  perceptive	  
analysis	  in	  Lyons,	  ‘Cobb	  and	  the	  Historians,’	  11-­‐12.	  
	  
44	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  81.	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the	  old	  army.’45	  He	  was	  court-­‐martialed	  and	  imprisoned	  several	  times,	  then	  
dishonorably	  discharged	  at	  29.	  When	  the	  Revolution	  came,	  Guénot	  seized	  his	  
chance	  and	  entered	  the	  police	  and	  prison	  services.	  At	  39,	  he	  became	  a	  full-­‐time	  
agent	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  General	  Security—a	  position	  that	  allowed	  him,	  at	  the	  
height	  of	  the	  Terror,	  to	  denounce	  and	  arrest	  a	  group	  of	  timber	  merchants	  from	  
his	  old	  village.	  After	  the	  Revolution,	  he	  was	  sent	  back	  to	  Voutenay.	  Hounded	  by	  
both	  vengeful	  notables	  and	  envious	  villagers,	  he	  survived	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  
as	  a	  ‘wild	  man	  of	  the	  woods.’46	  
	  
Guénot	  is,	  in	  two	  ways,	  an	  especially	  tough	  test	  for	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences.	  
First,	  he	  exhibited	  the	  extreme	  behavior	  of	  a	  monster.	  This	  behavior	  was	  often	  
incomprehensible.	  To	  his	  biographer,	  Guénot	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  ‘semi-­‐monster’	  
addicted	  to	  cruelty,	  violence,	  and	  vengeance.47	  He	  was	  a	  terrorist	  who	  could	  be	  
‘singularly	  merciless,	  harsh,	  vengeful,	  and	  unscrupulous	  in	  pursuit	  of	  his	  
enemies.’48	  When	  he	  was	  forced	  into	  a	  ‘Crusoe-­‐like’	  isolation	  in	  the	  woods,	  
Guénot	  turned	  inhuman	  to	  some	  degree,	  even	  forgetting	  ‘how	  to	  form	  coherent	  
sentences.’	  Later,	  ‘half	  mad’	  and	  ‘muttering	  curses	  and	  obscenities,’	  he	  
sometimes	  addressed	  the	  birds	  and	  trees.49	  Second,	  because	  of	  his	  longevity,	  
Guénot	  was	  ‘exceptional’	  even	  among	  the	  terrorists.50	  His	  career	  is	  
‘unrepresentative	  of	  most	  middle-­‐ranking	  terrorists’;	  few	  survived	  the	  White	  
Terror	  and	  even	  fewer	  lived	  long	  enough	  to	  see	  the	  two	  Restorations.51	  
	  
If	  Guénot	  seems	  too	  unusual	  be	  an	  archetype,	  must	  he	  become	  merely	  an	  
anecdote?	  Has	  Cobb	  told	  us	  a	  tale	  of	  someone	  who	  ‘happened	  to	  be	  alive	  at	  the	  
                                                
45	  Ibid.,	  79.	  
	  
46	  Ibid.,	  90.	  
	  
47	  Ibid.,	  93.	  
	  
48	  Ibid.,	  91.	  
	  
49	  Ibid.,	  90	  and	  89.	  
	  
50	  Ibid.,	  77.	  
	  
51	  Ibid.,	  86.	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time	  of	  the	  Revolution’?52	  His	  micro-­‐level	  tale	  would	  then	  offer	  us	  no	  macro-­‐level	  
insights.	  Cobb	  is	  alert	  to	  this	  danger.	  He	  warns	  against	  the	  ‘profitable,	  but	  
footling	  trap’	  of	  anecdotalism.53	  He	  means	  for	  us	  to	  infer	  new	  macro	  claims	  from	  
Guénot’s	  life,	  for	  he	  even	  states	  a	  version	  of	  the	  microhistorian’s	  manifesto:	  ‘to	  
make	  such	  personal	  case	  histories	  witness	  for	  a	  wider	  sector	  of	  opinion	  and	  for	  
elements	  of	  society	  unrepresented	  in	  the	  present	  account.’54	  	  
	  
3.1	   Postulates	  and	  Projections	  
How	  can	  a	  monster	  serve	  as	  witness	  for	  its	  society?	  Here	  is	  Cobb’s	  proposal:	  
‘Nicolas	  Guénot,	  in	  fact,	  offers	  an	  almost	  ideal	  case	  history	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
terrorist	  mentality	  and	  of	  the	  progressive	  commitment,	  in	  individual	  terms,	  to	  
the	  politics	  of	  violence.’55	  This	  suggests	  two	  related	  aims.	  First,	  we	  can	  use	  the	  
history	  of	  a	  monster’s	  life	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  to	  postulate	  about	  the	  society’s	  
mentalities.	  Second,	  we	  can	  use	  it	  to	  show	  us	  how	  to	  project	  individual	  
motivations	  to	  explain	  the	  monster’s	  behavior.	  Let	  me	  say	  how	  both	  aims	  involve	  
new	  macro	  claims.	  What	  is	  the	  key	  postulate	  in	  this	  case?	  Cobb	  speaks	  of	  the	  
‘slow,	  subterranean,	  perhaps	  unsuspected	  emergence	  of	  a	  terrorist	  mentality’	  
from	  the	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  period	  onwards.56	  Within	  this	  social	  mentality,	  
violence	  is	  an	  immediate	  and	  instinctive	  way	  to	  react.	  This	  is	  an	  attitude,	  rather	  
than	  ‘any	  form	  of	  coherent	  or	  organized	  opinion,	  openly	  expressed.’	  And	  it	  need	  
                                                
52	  I	  borrow	  this	  useful	  formulation	  from	  Lyons,	  ‘Cobb	  and	  the	  Historians,’	  12.	  
	  
53	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  129.	  
	  
54	   Ibid.,	   10.	   Sven-­‐Erik	   Klinkmann	   has	   drawn	   my	   attention	   to	   others	   who	   interpret	   a	   culture	  
through	  its	  monsters.	  They	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ways	  by	  which	  a	  culture	  identifies	  and	  represents	  
monsters;	   their	  modes	   of	   inference	   thus	   resemble	   those	   that	   I	   discussed	   above	   in	   relation	   to	  
marginal	  groups.	  See,	   for	   instance,	  Monster	  Theory:	  Reading	  Culture,	   ed.	   Jeffrey	   Jerome	  Cohen	  
(Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1996)	  and	  Jeffrey	  Jerome	  Cohen,	  Hybridity,	  Identity,	  
and	  Monstrosity	   in	  Medieval	   Britain:	   On	   Difficult	  Middles	   (London:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan,	   2006).	  
Cobb,	   as	   I	   interpret	   him,	   tries	   a	   different	   tack.	   He	   focuses	   on	   the	  monster’s	  mentality,	   not	   its	  
marginality.	  
	  
55	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  77.	  
	  
56	  Ibid.,	  65.	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not	  be	  ‘particularly	  conscious.’57	  But	  it	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  an	  individual:	  Guénot	  
was	  ‘almost	  pathologically	  violent;	  but	  so	  were	  his	  fellow-­‐villagers.’	  Their	  
collective	  attunement	  to	  violence	  was	  rooted	  in	  ‘a	  life	  of	  hardship,	  deprivation,	  
and	  brutality’	  during	  the	  decade	  before	  the	  Revolution.58	  For	  Cobb,	  this	  macro-­‐
level	  postulate	  adds	  to	  the	  ‘neglected,	  but	  so	  important,	  history	  of	  mentalities.’59	  
	  
Once	  we	  have	  postulated	  this	  social	  mentality	  in	  the	  background,	  we	  can	  
plausibly	  project	  individual	  motivations	  to	  explain	  Guénot’s	  extreme	  behavior.	  
His	  early	  start	  in	  a	  violent	  climate	  makes	  his	  later	  addiction	  to	  violent	  behavior	  
more	  comprehensible.	  Given	  that	  social	  mentality,	  Guénot’s	  pathologically	  
violent	  streak	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  product	  of	  at	  least	  three	  factors:	  ‘rage	  
and	  frustration	  at	  an	  unjust	  order	  of	  things,’	  ‘temperament,’	  and	  ‘long	  periods	  of	  
heavy	  drinking	  in	  braggart	  military	  company.’60	  We	  can	  begin	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
his	  ‘progressive	  commitment’	  to	  terrorist	  tactics—the	  ‘ease	  and	  naturalness’	  
with	  which	  he	  transformed	  from	  an	  exploited	  worker	  in	  violent	  company	  to	  a	  
violent	  semi-­‐criminal	  in	  the	  underworld,	  and	  then	  to	  a	  violent	  terrorist	  during	  the	  
Revolution.	  The	  Revolution	  provided	  a	  unique	  chance	  for	  him	  to	  ‘put	  his	  private	  
violence	  to	  public	  use.’61	  During	  the	  Terror,	  he	  was	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  for	  
power	  and	  vengeance	  against	  his	  former	  oppressors,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  crude	  political	  
convictions.	  ‘He	  enjoyed	  the	  Terror	  .	  .	  .	  was	  in	  it	  for	  what	  he	  could	  get	  out	  of	  it,	  
and	  had	  the	  further	  satisfaction	  no	  doubt	  of	  feeling	  that	  the	  enemies	  of	  the	  
Republic	  were	  also	  his	  own.’62	  His	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  recognizably	  human	  motivations.	  
                                                
57	   Ibid.,	   175.	   See	   also	   116:	   ‘It	   would	   certainly	   be	   unwise	   .	   .	   .	   to	  make	   too	  much	   of	   conscious	  
decision,	  deliberate	  ambition,	  clearly	  felt	  ideological	  conviction,	  or	  mere	  desire	  for	  power,	  as	  the	  
only	  sources	  of	  revolutionary	  commitment.’	  
	  
58	  Ibid.,	  76.	  
	  
59	  Ibid.,	  91.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  deliberate	  echo	  of	  the	  mentalités	  discussed	  by	  Annales	  historians.	  On	  
the	  troubled	  relation	  between	  Cobb	  and	  these	  historians,	  see	  Lyons,	   ‘Cobb	  and	  the	  Historians,’	  
18-­‐19;	  Lewis,	   ‘Richard	  Cobb,	  1917–1996,’	  246;	  and	  Jones,	   ‘Olwen	  Hufton’s	   ‘Poor’,’	  187-­‐188.	  See	  
also	  n.	  90	  below.	  
	  
60	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  82.	  
	  
61	  Ibid.,	  90.	  
	  
62	  Ibid.,	  84.	  
	  
19	  
Even	  Guénot’s	  final	  isolation	  in	  the	  woods	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  madness	  or	  
‘misanthropy	  alone’;	  it	  was	  partly	  motivated	  by	  his	  reasonable	  fear	  of	  
retribution.63	  	  
	  
Through	  these	  projections,	  we	  endow	  a	  monster	  with	  ‘human	  proportions.’64	  
Individual	  motivations	  can	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  those	  aspects	  of	  its	  behavior	  that	  
were	  once	  deemed	  inexplicable.	  So	  the	  monster	  was	  rather	  more	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  
its	  society.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  new	  macro	  claim	  about	  French	  society’s	  intelligibility.	  
Previously,	  Guénot’s	  extreme	  behavior	  marked	  a	  limit	  to	  that	  intelligibility.	  He	  
seemed	  to	  be	  a	  monstrous	  singularity.	  Now,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Cobb’s	  postulate	  of	  a	  
terrorist	  mentality	  and	  projections	  of	  some	  individual	  motivations,	  the	  total	  
intelligibility	  of	  French	  society	  during	  the	  Revolution	  increases.	  	  
	  
Might	  this	  new	  intelligibility	  go	  too	  far	  in	  reducing	  a	  monster’s	  complexity?	  Let	  
me	  highlight	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  history	  of	  a	  monster’s	  life	  need	  not	  be	  
reductive.	  First,	  projections	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  self-­‐interested	  motivations.	  Cobb	  
is	  at	  pains	  to	  remind	  us	  that	  Guénot’s	  ‘baser	  instincts’	  were	  mingled	  with	  
courage	  and	  ‘some	  rudimentary	  convictions,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  derived	  largely	  
from	  hatred	  and	  from	  the	  desire	  for	  vengeance.’65	  Second,	  postulates	  about	  
social	  mentalities	  do	  not	  entail	  the	  assumption	  that	  individual	  lives	  are	  
determined	  by	  social	  structures.	  Such	  postulates	  can	  be	  used,	  instead,	  as	  tools	  to	  
recover	  the	  terrorist’s	  individualism.66	  For	  Cobb,	  it	  is	  the	  interplay	  between	  
society’s	  terrorist	  mentality	  and	  Guénot’s	  individual	  motivations	  that	  makes	  
sense	  of	  his	  life.	  He	  does	  not	  interpret	  Guénot	  and	  other	  terrorists	  as	  ‘pawns	  in	  
some	  vast	  enterprise	  of	  social	  structure	  mechanics.’67	  He	  portrays	  them	  as	  
individuals	  ‘caught	  up	  in’—and	  sometimes	  ‘attempting	  to	  escape’—environment	  
                                                
63	  Ibid.,	  88.	  
	  
64	  Ibid.,	  9.	  
	  
65	  Ibid.,	  91	  and	  90.	  
	  
66	  Ibid.,	  117.	  On	  10,	  he	  defends	  his	  book	  as	  a	  ‘study	  of	  individualism.’	  
	  
67	  Ibid.,	  131.	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and	  collective	  commitment.68	  Guénot	  might	  be	  the	  ‘product	  of	  a	  society,	  of	  a	  
place,	  and	  of	  a	  trade,’	  but	  he	  did	  not	  end	  up	  like	  most	  flotteurs	  in	  Voutenay.69	  He	  
had	  at	  least	  the	  ‘independence’	  and	  ‘perhaps	  the	  good	  sense’	  to	  leave	  for	  and	  
linger	  in	  Paris.70	  Third,	  different	  sets	  of	  projections	  and	  postulates	  may	  make	  
equally	  good	  sense	  of	  Guénot.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  someone	  else,	  who	  does	  not	  
share	  Cobb’s	  prejudices	  or	  social	  position,	  may	  offer	  us	  a	  different	  macro-­‐level	  
postulate	  to	  interpret	  Guénot’s	  experience.71	  If	  so,	  we	  shall	  have	  to	  choose	  the	  
more	  plausible	  postulate	  or	  combine	  both	  postulates	  into	  a	  more	  complex	  
portrayal	  of	  Guénot’s	  society.	  	  
	  
3.2	   Idle	  Postulates	  
The	  first	  risk	  in	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences	  based	  on	  a	  monster’s	  life:	  What	  if	  the	  
postulate	  of	  a	  social	  mentality	  is	  idle?72	  Suppose	  that	  a	  historian	  tries	  to	  account	  
for	  Guénot’s	  terrorist-­‐like	  behavior	  by	  postulating	  a	  terrorist	  mentality	  in	  his	  
society.	  Without	  elaboration,	  this	  postulate	  explains	  nothing	  about	  Guénot’s	  
behavior	  or	  French	  society.	  At	  most,	  it	  re-­‐describes	  that	  behavior	  in	  convoluted	  
terms,	  as	  expressive	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  terrorist	  mentality.	  It	  can	  be	  too	  easy	  to	  
multiply	  macro-­‐level	  mentalities	  in	  this	  empty	  fashion	  for	  all	  micro-­‐level	  
behaviors	  that	  we	  find	  incomprehensible.	  Everything,	  and	  thus	  nothing,	  will	  be	  
explained.	  This	  risk	  stands	  out	  whenever	  Cobb	  gestures	  vaguely	  at	  the	  reach	  of	  
the	  terrorist	  mentality:	  ‘up	  and	  down	  the	  country,	  there	  must	  have	  been	  tens	  of	  
                                                
68.	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69.	  Ibid.,	  94.	  
	  
70.	  Ibid.,	  78.	  
	  
71.	  I	  thank	  Jacques	  Revel	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  that	  we	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  to	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  any	  macro	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72.	   I	  am	  alluding	   to	  Wittgenstein’s	   images	  of	  an	   ‘idling	  engine’	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  wheel	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   nothing	   else	   moves	   with	   it’	   so	   that	   it	   is	   ‘not	   part	   of	   the	   mechanism’;	   see	   Ludwig	  




thousands	  of	  men	  like	  him,	  of	  whom	  we	  know	  little	  or	  nothing.’73	  He	  does	  not	  
doubt	  that	  there	  were	  ‘many	  more	  terrorists	  like	  him,	  though	  less	  
discoverable.’74	  So	  what	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  confidence?	  
	  
As	  I	  read	  him,	  Cobb	  deploys	  a	  norm	  of	  connection	  here:	  A	  macro-­‐level	  postulate	  
is	  strengthened	  if	  it	  draws	  surprising	  connections	  between	  micro-­‐level	  
phenomena	  previously	  seen	  as	  distinct.	  The	  terrorist	  mentality,	  which	  Cobb	  
postulates,	  not	  only	  accounts	  for	  Guénot’s	  violent	  behavior	  during	  the	  Terror.	  It	  
also	  connects	  that	  behavior	  with	  two	  other	  sets	  of	  micro-­‐level	  phenomena.	  First,	  
there	  is	  what	  happened	  to	  Guénot	  when	  he	  was	  sent	  back	  to	  Voutenay	  after	  the	  
Revolution.	  His	  repeated	  and	  violent	  persecution	  by	  the	  community	  illustrates	  
the	  ‘everlasting	  memories	  of	  rural	  vengeance’	  and	  the	  ‘administrative	  terror	  that	  
was	  the	  common	  lot’	  in	  rural	  France	  under	  the	  Imperial	  regime.75	  These	  later	  
events	  fit	  the	  social	  mentality	  postulated	  by	  Cobb,	  in	  which	  violence	  is	  
immediate	  and	  instinctive.	  Second,	  there	  is	  the	  ‘bad,	  brutal	  school’	  that	  brought	  
up	  the	  community.76	  Everyone	  was	  accustomed,	  before	  the	  Revolution,	  to	  a	  
nobility	  that	  inflicted	  violence,	  with	  impunity	  and	  insolence,	  on	  the	  lower	  orders	  
and	  womenfolk.	  Even	  the	  government	  was	  savage;	  Cobb	  describes	  how	  it	  did	  not	  
hesitate	  to	  ‘employ	  terror’	  against	  rural	  law-­‐breakers.	  Thus	  his	  postulate	  also	  
receives	  some	  confirmation	  from	  concrete	  details	  about	  ‘the	  reality	  of	  life	  .	  .	  .	  in	  
ancien	  régime	  France.’	  77	  
	  
He	  also	  relies,	  implicitly,	  on	  a	  norm	  of	  provocation.	  A	  macro-­‐level	  postulate	  is	  
useful	  if	  it	  provokes	  productive	  questions	  about	  other	  micro-­‐level	  phenomena.78	  
                                                
73	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  82.	  
	  
74	  Ibid.,	  90.	  
	  
75	  Ibid.,	  91	  and	  87.	  
	  
76	  Ibid.,	  93.	  He	  adds	  here	  that,	  to	  understand	  Guénot,	  we	  need	  to	  ‘sufficiently	  relate	  the	  violence	  
of	  the	  man	  to	  that	  of	  his	  background.’	  	  
	  
77	  Ibid.,	  94.	  
	  
78	   In	   his	   introduction,	   on	   14,	   Cobb	   says	   that	   his	   book	   is	   ‘designed	   as	   much	   to	   put	   forward	  
deductions	   that	   may	   be	   proved	   wrong	   .	   .	   .	   or	   to	   suggest	   further	   lines	   of	   approach.’	   On	   the	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Cobb	  uses	  the	  postulate	  of	  a	  terrorist	  mentality	  to	  raise	  a	  new	  question:	  Did	  this	  
social	  mentality	  influence	  the	  behavior	  of	  terrorists	  from	  ‘a	  very	  different	  social	  
origin’?	  For	  these	  terrorists,	  ‘the	  distance	  between	  private	  life	  and	  public	  
terrorism’	  seemed	  greater.79	  To	  explore	  this	  question,	  Cobb	  considers	  the	  
revolutionary	  career	  of	  Cochon	  de	  Lapperant,	  a	  provincial	  lawyer	  who	  rose	  to	  be	  
second	  Minister	  of	  Police	  during	  the	  Revolution	  and	  sent	  many	  to	  their	  deaths.	  
He	  explores	  various	  ‘parallels’	  and	  ‘contrasts’	  with	  Guénot	  and	  concludes	  that	  
‘Cochon	  too	  was	  a	  terrorist,	  but,	  unlike	  Guénot,	  one	  by	  calculation,	  rather	  than	  
by	  temperament	  or	  pre-­‐disposition.’80	  Unfortunately,	  Cobb	  also	  finds	  Cochon	  to	  
be	  a	  ‘boring,	  very	  ordinary	  administrator’	  whose	  mentality	  it	  would	  be	  
‘impossible	  to	  reconstruct.’81	  How	  far	  Cochon’s	  calculations	  were	  influenced	  by	  
the	  terrorist	  mentality	  and	  what	  his	  motivations	  were	  for	  terrorizing	  others:	  
these	  remain,	  for	  us,	  open	  questions.	  
	  
3.3	   Indulgent	  Projections	  
The	  second	  risk:	  What	  if	  the	  projections	  of	  individual	  motivations	  to	  explain	  a	  
monster’s	  behavior	  turn	  indulgent?	  Cobb	  seeks	  to	  give	  ‘human	  proportions’	  to	  
the	  monster,	  but	  this	  may	  encourage	  a	  form	  of	  wishful	  thinking	  when	  we	  are	  
dealing	  with	  the	  unknown	  motivations	  of	  obscure	  characters.	  If	  historians	  permit	  
themselves	  to	  project	  motivations	  at	  the	  micro	  level	  in	  an	  unconstrained	  fashion,	  
then	  the	  improved	  intelligibility	  of	  French	  society	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  will	  be	  
illusory.	  Cobb	  does	  not	  ignore	  this	  risk.	  He	  notes	  that,	  in	  exploring	  the	  margins	  
and	  monsters	  of	  revolutionary	  France,	  ‘we	  are	  indeed	  groping	  in	  a	  zone	  d’ombre,	  
into	  which	  we	  may	  at	  best	  have	  allowed	  to	  penetrate	  very	  occasional	  shafts	  of	  
light—seldom	  the	  light	  of	  evidence	  or	  of	  concrete	  fact—more	  often	  that	  of	  
                                                                                                                                 
intellectual	   value	  of	  provocation:	   I	  have	  profited	   from	  discussions	  with	  Katherine	   J.	  Morris	   and	  
Steve	  Woolgar.	  
	  
79	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  94.	  
	  
80	  Ibid.,	  95.	  
	  
81	  Ibid.,	  97.	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tentative,	  inventive	  perception,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  more	  baldly,	  historical	  guessing.’82	  
He	  even	  admits	  that	  he	  finds	  incomprehensible	  the	  motivations	  of	  those	  
terrorists	  who	  bore	  or	  frighten	  him.	  This	  suggests	  that	  historians’	  interests	  and	  
sympathies	  can	  influence	  their	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  monster’s	  life.	  If	  so,	  
the	  risk	  of	  indulgent	  projections	  is	  heightened.	  
	  
This	  risk	  can	  be	  defused.	  One	  of	  my	  purposes	  in	  this	  essay	  has	  been	  to	  show	  that,	  
beneath	  his	  ‘historical	  guessing’	  and	  ‘groping,’	  Cobb	  has	  built	  a	  subtle	  inferential	  
structure.83	  He	  often	  cannot	  verify	  the	  individual	  motivations	  of	  monsters	  
directly	  by	  ‘evidence’	  or	  ‘concrete	  fact.’	  But	  this	  does	  not	  lead	  him	  to	  project	  
those	  motivations	  in	  a	  fit	  of	  fantasy.	  Instead,	  his	  micro-­‐level	  projections	  and	  
macro-­‐level	  postulates	  are	  mutually	  supportive	  inferences.	  The	  latter	  are	  also	  
held	  in	  place	  by	  the	  useful	  connections	  and	  provocations	  that	  they	  make	  about	  
other	  micro-­‐level	  phenomena.	  Moreover,	  Cobb’s	  postulates	  and	  projections	  are	  
constrained	  by	  the	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐level	  discoveries	  of	  other	  ‘more	  well-­‐tried	  
approaches.’84	  His	  case	  studies	  are	  meant	  to	  ‘supplement,’	  not	  substitute	  for,	  
those	  approaches.	  
	  
A	  strategy	  of	  micro-­‐level	  contextualization	  also	  offers	  some	  help.	  The	  projection	  
of	  individual	  motivations	  is	  strengthened	  if	  we	  can	  embed	  them	  within	  their	  
micro-­‐level	  context.	  This	  strategy	  is	  easily	  misunderstood.85	  When	  historians	  
speak	  of	  ‘contextualizing’	  a	  micro-­‐level	  phenomenon,	  they	  usually	  place	  that	  
phenomenon	  within	  its	  more	  macro-­‐level	  settings.	  Their	  aim	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  
wider	  significance	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  by	  relating	  it	  to	  those	  settings.	  They	  are,	  
                                                
82	   Ibid.,	   179.	  On	  128,	   he	   admits:	   ‘In	   this	   frontier	   zone	  of	   history,	  much	  will	   remain	  unstated,	   a	  
great	  deal	   has	   to	  be	   guessed	  at,	   often	  on	   very	   thin	  evidence,	   something	  may	  even	  have	   to	  be	  
invented.’	  
	  
83	  See	  Lyons,	  ‘Cobb	  and	  the	  Historians,’	  11:	  ‘Cobb’s	  anti-­‐method	  may	  claim	  to	  be	  impressionistic,	  
but	  paradoxically	  it	  is	  based	  on	  exhaustive	  research.’	  He	  sees,	  in	  Cobb,	  ‘an	  approach	  to	  historical	  
investigation	  which	  almost	  amounts	  to	  a	  method.’	  
	  
84	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  126.	  
	  
85	  I	  have	  learned	  from	  Levi,	  ‘On	  Microhistory,’	  111	  and	  Revel,	  ‘Microanalysis	  and	  the	  Construction	  
of	  the	  Social,’	  502,	  who	  distinguish	  two	  ways	  for	  historians	  to	  deploy	  context.	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as	  it	  were,	  working	  outwards.	  Cobb	  faces	  a	  different	  problem	  here.	  He	  must	  
work	  inwards.	  He	  has	  already	  postulated	  the	  macro-­‐level	  mentalities	  that	  may	  be	  
the	  settings	  for	  a	  monster’s	  behavior.	  Now	  he	  needs	  to	  figure	  out	  if	  some	  
individual	  motivations,	  combined	  with	  those	  social	  mentalities,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
explain	  the	  monster’s	  behavior.	  Contextualization,	  in	  this	  case,	  spells	  out	  the	  
micro-­‐level	  details	  of	  the	  monster’s	  behavior	  and	  environment	  so	  that	  any	  new	  
projections	  of	  motivations	  can	  gain	  traction.	  	  
	  
I	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  partly	  why	  Cobb	  lavishes	  such	  detail	  in	  his	  histories	  of	  
Guénot	  and	  other	  monsters.	  He	  need	  not	  be	  indulging	  in	  ‘the	  love	  of	  detail	  for	  its	  
own	  sake,’	  refusing	  to	  place	  material	  in	  ‘a	  general	  historical	  context’	  or	  reducing	  
history	  to	  ‘a	  string	  of	  anecdotes.’86	  Instead,	  I	  interpret	  him	  to	  be	  fulfilling	  a	  
specific	  historiographical	  task:	  showing	  his	  audience	  the	  intricate	  context	  of	  
micro-­‐level	  details	  that	  justify	  his	  projections	  of	  individual	  motivations.	  Such	  
projections	  then	  earn	  their	  keep,	  at	  the	  macro	  level,	  by	  increasing	  the	  
intelligibility	  of	  French	  society.	  Here	  Cobb’s	  literary	  skills	  in	  finding	  and	  
presenting	  narrative	  detail	  have	  a	  historiographical	  role.	  They	  support	  his	  use	  of	  
micro-­‐level	  contextualization.	  
	  
4	   Conclusion	  
The	  challenge:	  How	  do	  micro	  cases	  in	  history	  lead	  us	  to	  surprising	  macro	  claims?	  
In	  this	  essay,	  I	  focused	  on	  marginal	  groups	  and	  monsters.	  My	  main	  
historiographical	  findings	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  First,	  I	  
distinguished	  four	  kinds	  of	  micro-­‐to-­‐macro	  inferences.	  By	  looking	  at	  how	  a	  
society	  identifies	  a	  marginal	  group	  and	  interacts	  with	  it,	  we	  can	  draw	  macro-­‐level	  
inferences	  about	  that	  society’s	  self-­‐image	  and	  situation.	  By	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  
monster’s	  life,	  we	  can	  draw	  macro-­‐level	  inferences	  about	  its	  society’s	  mentality	  
and	  intelligibility.	  Then	  I	  identified	  four	  risks	  in	  these	  inferences.	  These	  are	  the	  
risks	  of	  spurious	  identifications,	  insignificant	  interactions,	  idle	  postulates,	  and	  
                                                
86	  These	  are	  cited	  as	  three	  dangers	  in	  Lyons,	  ‘Cobb	  and	  the	  Historians,’	  12.	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indulgent	  projections.	  Finally,	  I	  showed	  how	  the	  norms	  of	  coherence,	  challenge,	  
restraint,	  connection,	  provocation,	  and	  contextualization	  can	  be	  used	  to	  manage	  
those	  risks.	  	  
	  
	  
These	  four	  kinds	  of	  inferences	  suggest	  a	  joint	  criterion	  for	  assessing	  the	  macro	  
significance	  of	  a	  micro	  case:	  How	  far	  does	  it	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  a	  
society’s	  self-­‐image,	  situation,	  mentality,	  and	  intelligibility?	  The	  six	  norms	  of	  
interpretation	  can	  then	  be	  translated	  into	  the	  following	  sub-­‐criteria.	  
1.	  Does	  the	  case	  study	  find	  a	  surprising	  coherence	  in	  behavior	  at	  the	  
micro	  level?	  
2.	  Does	  the	  case	  study	  confirm	  or	  challenge	  what	  we	  already	  accept	  
as	  meaningful	  at	  the	  macro	  level?	  
3.	  Does	  the	  case	  study	  impose	  on	  the	  audience	  new	  meanings	  at	  the	  
macro	  level,	  or	  does	  it	  invite	  the	  audience	  to	  engage	  with	  them?	  
4.	  Does	  the	  case	  study	  draw	  surprising	  connections	  between	  distinct	  
phenomena	  at	  the	  micro	  level?	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5.	  Does	  the	  case	  study	  provoke	  productive	  questions	  about	  other	  
phenomena	  at	  the	  micro	  level?	  
6.	  Does	  the	  case	  study	  contain	  sufficient	  details	  at	  the	  micro	  level	  to	  
contextualize	  motivations,	  and	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  to	  contextualize	  
mentalities?	  
	  
I	  hope	  that	  spelling	  out	  these	  sub-­‐criteria	  so	  bluntly	  will	  be	  useful.	  It	  is	  a	  first	  step	  
to	  investigating	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  applied	  and	  assessed	  together.	  What	  
should	  historians	  do	  if	  these	  criteria	  come	  into	  conflict?	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  ready	  
answer.	  However,	  these	  criteria	  already	  give	  us	  a	  better	  grasp	  of	  the	  multi-­‐level	  
context	  within	  which	  historians	  and	  others	  can	  appeal	  to	  ‘coherence’	  as	  a	  
theoretical	  ideal.	  
	  
My	  historiographical	  findings	  are	  drawn	  from	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  Cobb’s	  case	  
studies	  about	  revolutionary	  France.	  The	  reading	  does	  not	  explore	  any	  connection	  
between	  these	  case	  studies	  and	  his	  other	  writings	  or	  his	  debates	  with	  other	  
historians	  about	  the	  French	  Revolution.	  It	  is,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  a	  micro	  study	  of	  
a	  micro	  study.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  reflexive	  worry:	  Do	  I	  face	  the	  same	  risks	  that	  I	  have	  
found	  in	  Cobb?87	  Insofar	  as	  I	  base	  my	  macro	  claims	  about	  historiography	  on	  this	  
micro	  study	  of	  Cobb’s	  method,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  manage	  the	  risks	  in	  his	  manner.	  
First,	  I	  highlighted	  a	  neglected	  connection	  between	  Cobb’s	  interest	  in	  micro-­‐to-­‐
macro	  inferences	  and	  other	  historians’	  interest	  in	  them.	  Second,	  I	  identified	  a	  
surprising	  coherence	  in	  the	  historiographical,	  autobiographical,	  and	  literary	  
values	  of	  Cobb’s	  case	  studies.	  These	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  implicit	  norms	  that	  govern	  his	  
inferences.	  Third,	  I	  used	  Cobb’s	  inferences	  to	  challenge	  what	  we	  count	  as	  macro	  
claims.	  Then	  I	  used	  his	  norms	  to	  provoke	  new	  possibilities	  in	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  
margins	  and	  monsters,	  and	  in	  how	  we	  combine	  history	  with	  autobiography.	  
Finally,	  I	  invite	  others	  to	  adapt	  these	  inferences	  and	  norms	  for	  their	  own	  use.	  
They	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  rigid	  rules	  imposed	  on	  anyone.	  
                                                
87	  I	  thank	  Brian	  Fay	  and	  an	  anonymous	  reader	  for	  pressing	  me	  to	  address	  this	  explicitly.	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This	  reading	  of	  Cobb	  is,	  primarily,	  a	  philosophical	  response.	  It	  comes	  from	  an	  
abstract	  angle.	  But	  I	  claim	  no	  special	  authority	  for	  philosophers	  to	  interpret	  
historians.	  I	  envisage	  a	  dialogue	  between	  them.	  For	  philosophers,	  the	  
historiographical	  norms	  that	  manage	  micro	  and	  macro	  levels	  may	  transform	  
some	  debates,	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  about	  
reductionism	  between	  levels	  of	  theory	  or	  reality.88	  After	  reading	  Cobb,	  I	  find	  it	  
difficult	  to	  accept,	  at	  face	  value,	  philosophical	  claims	  about	  coherence	  or	  
simplicity	  that	  focus	  on	  any	  one	  level.	  Might	  this	  focus	  unduly	  obscure	  the	  
meanings	  at	  another	  level?	  My	  sub-­‐criteria	  offer	  a	  way	  to	  check.	  For	  historians,	  
especially	  those	  tempted	  into	  historiographical	  reflection,	  the	  philosophical	  tools	  
that	  increase	  abstraction	  may	  clarify	  those	  norms	  underlying	  their	  practices.	  
	  
Such	  a	  dialogue	  has	  its	  own	  risks.	  Even	  Cobb	  has	  warned	  against	  too	  much	  
abstraction,	  though	  he	  was	  criticizing	  other	  historians,	  not	  philosophers.89	  When	  
I	  first	  offered	  my	  reading	  to	  others,	  a	  bemused	  French	  historian	  noted	  this	  
oddity:	  Can	  one	  really	  find	  a	  methodology	  in	  Cobb?	  He	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  ‘confirmed	  
empiricist.’	  The	  microhistorian	  Carlo	  Ginzburg	  also	  finds	  Cobb	  to	  be	  
unsympathetic—an	  ‘empiricist	  who	  claims	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  theoretical	  
questions’	  and	  a	  ‘confirmed	  cultivator	  of	  his	  own	  eccentricity.’90	  But	  I	  have	  
shown	  that	  Cobb’s	  avowed	  ‘historical	  impressionism’	  is	  guided	  by	  an	  inventive	  
                                                
88	  A	  case	  study	  that	  uses	  this	  approach	  is	  in	  my	  ‘Models	  as	  Interpreters	  (with	  a	  Case	  Study	  from	  
Pain	  Science),’	  Studies	   in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  42	   (2011),	  303-­‐312.	   I	   show	  how	  the	  
discovery	  of	  new	  micro-­‐level	  phenomena	  (in	  neuroscience	  and	  physiology)	   led	  to	  a	  controversy	  
about	  their	  macro-­‐level	  meanings	  (in	  medicine	  and	  psychology).	  See	  also	  the	  suggestive	  last	  line	  
in	   Giuseppina	   D’Oro,	   ‘Historiographic	   Understanding,’	   in	   A	   Companion	   to	   the	   Philosophy	   of	  
History	  and	  Historiography,	  ed.	  Aviezer	  Tucker	  (Oxford:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2009):	   ‘Conversely,	  the	  
relevance	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  historiography	  to	  discussions	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  
recognized.’	  
	  
89	   For	   a	   taste	   of	   his	   polemic,	   see	   Richard	   Cobb,	   ‘Historians	   in	   White	   Coats,’	   Times	   Literary	  
Supplement	   (December	   3,	   1971),	   1527-­‐1528.	   Two	   earlier	   reviews	   are	   unsigned,	   in	   accordance	  
with	  the	  newspaper’s	  practice	  then:	  ‘À	  Bas	  La	  Révolution!,’	  Times	  Literary	  Supplement	  (January	  7,	  
1965),	  8	  and	  ‘Annalists’	  Revolution,’	  Times	  Literary	  Supplement	   (September	  8,	  1966),	  819-­‐820.	   I	  
note	  that	  his	  animus	  is	  usually	  directed	  at	  the	  ‘crude,’	  ‘rigid,’	  ‘schematic,’	  or	  ‘mechanistic’	  use	  of	  
abstract	   theories	  and	  structures.	  He	  praises	   two	  older	  colleagues,	  Georges	  Lefebvre	  and	  Albert	  
Soboul,	  when	  they	  use	  these	  cautiously	  and	  flexibly	  to	  frame	  their	  more	  intricate	  analyses.	  
	  
90	  Ginzburg,	  ‘Microhistory:	  Two	  or	  Three	  Things	  That	  I	  Know	  about	  It,’	  16-­‐17.	  But	  see	  n.	  48	  on	  23,	  
where	  he	  acknowledges	  an	  instance	  of	  Cobb’s	  methodological	  awareness.	  
	  
28	  
historiographical	  sensibility.	  His	  is	  a	  risky	  style	  of	  history	  that	  gropes	  after	  its	  own	  
rigors.	  He	  writes	  a	  history	  of	  margins	  and	  monsters	  in	  order	  to	  unwrite	  the	  
received	  histories	  of	  the	  non-­‐marginal	  and	  non-­‐monstrous.	  He	  studies	  obscure	  
individuals	  in	  order	  to	  find	  ‘lost	  attitudes,	  pre-­‐suppositions,	  assumptions,	  and	  
submerged	  mentalities.’91	  He	  postulates	  social	  mentalities	  in	  order	  to	  make	  room	  
for	  individual	  motivations.	  He	  flaunts	  his	  prejudices	  in	  a	  display	  of	  restraint.	  He	  
uses	  autobiographical	  means	  for	  historiographical	  ends.	  Each	  apparent	  
eccentricity	  is	  turned	  into	  a	  productive	  possibility.	  Almost	  every	  one	  of	  them	  
offends	  a	  neat	  dichotomy	  that	  the	  philosopher	  in	  me	  craves;	  and	  yet	  Cobb	  strikes	  
me	  as	  a	  deeply	  philosophical	  writer,	  constantly	  questioning	  the	  method	  and	  
authority	  by	  which	  he	  writes	  history.	  He	  worries	  openly	  about	  his	  use	  of	  
‘personal	  case	  histories,’	  hoping	  that	  he	  has	  ‘not	  attempted	  to	  read	  in	  them	  too	  
much	  or	  to	  push	  them	  too	  far.’92	  ‘Better’	  history	  is,	  for	  him,	  not	  always	  history	  
that	  is	  more	  certain	  and	  ‘less	  tentative.’93	  What	  he	  wants	  are	  new	  angles	  of	  
vision	  and	  a	  language	  that	  can	  include	  ‘a	  multitude	  of	  suggestions,	  while	  leaving	  
all	  channels	  conveniently	  open.’94	  If	  this	  be	  empiricism,	  it	  is	  one	  always	  attuned	  








                                                
91	  Cobb,	  Reactions	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  179.	  
	  
92	   Ibid.,	  10.	  I	  do	  not	  fully	  understand	  how	  Cobb	  distinguishes	  ‘too	  much’	  from	  ‘too	  far.’	  Perhaps	  
these	   critical	   terms	   are	   related,	   respectively,	   to	   what	   I	   call	   indulgent	   projections	   and	   idle	  
postulates.	  	  
	  
93	  Ibid.,	  17	  and	  128.	  
	  
94	  Ibid.,	  179.	  
	  
